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Abstract—In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions
are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their
unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs).
As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate
more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. As
buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction
to better serve their end users.
In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading
market consisting of the SH, the WSPs and the end users.
We jointly study the strategies of the three parties. The SH
determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to optimize
its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms
of both demands and valuations considering the strategies of
the end users. We design FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism
for this market to enable dynamic supplies and demands in the
auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc not only maximizes
the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such
as truthfulness and computational tractability.
Index Terms—Spectrum Auction, Flexible Demand, Truthful-
ness
I. Introduction
Auctions are usually applied for spectrum redistribution to
increase efficiency. In the spectrum trading markets, major
wireless service providers (WSPs) purchase spectrum through
auctions organized by the spectrum holders (SH). It is essential
for the SH to determine the auction schemes and for the
WSPs to determine proper bidding strategies in the auction
to optimize their revenues.
Here we have two key observations. First, the number of
channels on sale in the auction have an significant impact
on the revenue of the SH. Given a fixed total bandwidth, a
finer channelization provides more supplies, but induce higher
costs in terms of larger guard bands and higher complexity.
However, no existing works in the literature have consider this
strategies of SH. The most related one is [1]. In [1], Wang et
al. considers the resource segmentation between auction and
another pricing scheme for a cloud computing market. The
supplies of cloud instances in the auction can be dynamic.
But they fail to consider different capacities of one instance
which is equivalent to different channelization in the spectrum
auctions.
Second, the WSPs’ bidding strategies relate tightly to the
service provisions to the end users. Both the WSPs’ demands
and valuations can be flexible in the auction due to their end
users’ heterogeneous demands and willingness to pay. How-
ever, existing works failed to enable the WSPs’ flexible bid-
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ding strategies. There are no suitable existing auction schemes
that are able to promote flexible biddings with computational
efficiency. Most works rely on over-simplified assumptions or
induce heavy overheads. Some of them ([2], [3], [4]) assume
that one buyer can claim for at most one channel. Some
others [5][6] assume that a buyer can submit bids for multiple
channels but win at most one. These assumptions indeed limit
the scope of applications especially when a buyer is willing to
win more than one channels. Although combinatorial auctions
(e.g. [7]) can meet the requirements of flexible auction, it
induces very heavy computational overheads.
Considering these flexibilities, it is therefore important for
the SH to determine proper channelization of the unused
spectrum and to design auction schemes to motivate the buyers
to reveal their truthful demands and valuations.
In this paper, we aim to address the two problems mentioned
above. Specifically, we consider a three-layered spectrum
trading scenario shown in Fig. 1 consisting of the SH, the
WSPs and the end users. The SH has a fixed sized unused
spectrum to be redistributed to the WSPs via an secondary
spectrum auction. As a seller, the SH partitions the spectrum
into multiple channels with equal bandwidth and designs the
auction mechanism. The SH can determine the size of a
channel. As buyers, the WSPs decide their bidding strategies
in the auction, which is flexible in term of both demands and
bids. With the channels won in the auction, the WSPs serve
and charge their end users. All the three parties involved in the
scenario are rational and trying to optimize their own utility.
In this paper, we propose a new secondary spectrum trading
framework to solve the challenges in this problem. The key
component in our solution framework is a novel auction
mechanism called FlexAuc (Flexible Auction). In FlexAuc, the
SH announces the total number of channels and the bandwidth
of each channel for sale. The channels are indifferent for the
same WSP. But may be valuated differently across WSPs.
Then the WSPs each submit a series of bids to represent their
willingness to pay for the channels in an ordinal order. For
example, if an WSP would like to pay the first won channel
with payment b1 and the second won channel with b2, the
bids would be {b1, b2}. In this way, both the demand and the
valuations of WSPs can be flexibly expressed in the auction.
We propose two new payment mechanisms to allow the SH
to charge the winners in the auction. We prove in the paper
that the auction scheme with different payment mechanisms
are all not only truthful but can also maximize social welfare.
Along with FlexAuc, we also jointly consider the strategies
of the SH in terms of the channelization and the service
provision between the WSPs and their end users. The SH
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Fig. 1: A three-layered network scenario
chooses the best spectrum partitioning scheme to optimize its
revenue. The WSPs decide their services prices according to
the results from the auction.
In summary, the key conclusions and contributions of this
work are summarized as follows.
1) As far as we know, this paper is the first to study the
flexible auction mechanism in the secondary spectrum
trading market, where the WSPs can flexibly decide the
best quantity of channels to buy and the best bidding
values.
2) We design FlexAuc, with two novel payment mecha-
nisms to serve flexible demands in secondary spectrum
auctions. We prove that FlexAuc is not only truthful but
also maximize social welfare.
3) We jointly study the channelization problem for the SH
and the service provision problem for the WSPs and
derive optimize strategies to maximize their revenues.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We summarize
the research literature in Section II. The detailed system model,
concept definitions and design objectives are described in
Section III. In Section IV, we discuss the spectrum partition,
and elaborate auction mechanism, bidding behaviors and the
demand response as well as pricing mechanism. We analyze
the economic properties in Section V, specifically truthful-
ness, efficiency and time complexity. Section VI provides
our numerical results to verify our design objectives and
make comparison with previous works to show advantages
of FlexAuc. We conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. Related Work
We provide a summary of state-of-the-art auction mecha-
nisms in this section.
Most of the state-of-the-art mechanisms assume that buyers
can claim at most one channel. These mechanisms cannot
satisfy the flexible demands from buyers. Single-seller multi-
buyer auction with homogeneous channels has been studied
extensively. VERITAS in [2] allowed users to buy channels
based on their demands and spectrum owner to maximize
revenue with spectrum reuse. In [3] the authors proposed
a VCG auction to maximize the expected revenue of the
seller and a suboptimal auction to reduce the complexity for
practical purpose. Double auction mechanisms are studied for
the multi-seller multi-buyer case. McAfee mechanism [8] was
proposed for trading homogeneous items in double auction.
Many follow-up works has been done since then [4], [9], [5],
[10].
One recent mechanism for heterogeneous demands is de-
signed for the cloud services [11]. Unlike our work, in [11],
each bidder has only uniform unit valuations for any amount of
demands. Another mechanism that enables the flexible demand
is combinatorial auction [7][12]. In this model, each buyer
can submit a bid to flexibly claim time-channel combinations.
The major concern for combinatorial auction is that in general
cases, the problem is NP-hard. It means that the mechanism
is not suitable for periodic auctions with too many buyers and
channels.
Furthermore, no existing works on spectrum auction consid-
ers the strategies of spectrum sellers in terms of channelization.
The most related one is [1], which is focused on a cloud
computing market. In [1], Wang et al. study the resource
segmentation between a periodic auction scheme and a pay-as-
you-go scheme. The supplies of cloud instances in the auction
can be dynamically allocated. Unlike [1] where one cloud
instance has a fixed capacity, in this paper, the SH can vary the
channel bandwidth and create different supplies in the auction.
In a preliminary version of this paper [13], we also omit the
channelization strategy of the SH.
In summary, none of the existing works provided a feasible
auction scheme to enable flexible demand with polynomial
time complexity. Most polynomial time auction models do
not support flexible demand. Combinatorial auction supports
flexible demand, but they are not computational efficient.
FlexAuc preserves good properties of both types. Furthermore,
this paper is the first to consider the channelization strategies
of the SH for secondary spectrum auctions.
III. Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
In this section, we first describe our general scenario, then
the definition of the strategies, utility functions and concepts.
A. System Model
We consider a scenario of a macrocell with one SH denoted
as S and N WSPs denoted as W = {W1,W2, · · · ,WN}. The
SH has a spectrum block of total bandwidth size B0 to sell.
The bandwidth is partitioned into C channels, each with the
same bandwidth B. To avoid interference between adjacent
channels, we assume a guard band of size b0 should be placed
between every pair of adjacent channels. Therefore, there are
C − 1 guard bands for C channels. It is easy to check that the
following relationship holds:
B =
B0 + b0
C
− b0. (1)
Each WSP deploys infrastructures within the coverage of the
same macrocell as the SH. The WSPs obtained the bandwidth
from the SH via an auction organized by the SH to serve its
end users. A WSP Wi’s bid in the auction is defined as a
vector consisting of C bids: Bi = {bi1, bi2, · · · , biC}. It means
that Wi is willing to pay bi1 for the first winning channel, bi2
for the second winning channel, and so on.
3Fig. 2: A four-staged analysis framework.
The WSPs also charges their end users with certain service
fees. We assume the price for the usage of unit bandwidth of
Wi is pi. Due to the diversified capacity of the WSPs in terms
of transmission powers and service types, the service qualities
of the WSPs can also be different. We use αi to denote the
evaluation of the unit data rate fromWi to describe its service
quality.
We assume that there are Ni end users subscribing to the
WSP Wi (1 ≤ i ≤ N). We denote the j-th end user of Wi
(1 ≤ j ≤ Ni) as Uij. The end users of an WSP can decide how
much bandwidth to subscribe to maximize their own utility.
Suppose the bandwidth strategy of Uij is wij, we assume that
it can achieve a data rate of Rij = w
i
j ln
(
1 + PiH jn0wij
)
, where Pi is
the transmission power level of base stations ofWi; H j is the
path loss factor; and n0 is the power density of thermal noise.
Let gij =
PiH j
n0
denote the factor related to the signal-to-noise
ratio for Uij. We can rewrite Rij as:
Rij = w
i
j ln
1 + gijwij
 . (2)
B. Spectrum Trading and Pricing Procedure
The spectrum trading and pricing procedure involves the
SH, the WSPs and their end users. There are five steps in the
procedure shown in Fig. 2.
The SH first decides the channelization scheme for the
available spectrum, i.e determines the number of channels
to be distributed in the auction and the auction schemes in
terms of winner determination and payment mechanisms in
Stage I and II respectively. Being informed about the number
of channels for sale and the auction mechanism, the WSPs
then determines their bidding strategies in stage III. When the
auction is complete, the WSPs decide pricing schemes for the
end users based on the winning channels obtained in stage IV.
Finally in stage V, the end users decide how much demand to
subscribe from the WSPs given the prices.
C. Utility Functions
Based on the system model and the trading procedure, we
can define the utility functions for the SH, the WSPs and the
end users.
1) Spectrum Holder: The utility of the spectrum holder
is defined as the revenue from the auction. In the spectrum
auction, the SH determines the winner of each channel and
the prices. Suppose the number of channels won byWi is Ki,
each with price cij, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki. The utility of the SH can be
written as:
US =
N∑
i=1
Ki∑
j=1
cij. (3)
2) WSPs: The utility of the WSPs are defined as the
difference between the payment from the end users and the
prices paid in the auction. ForWi, the total bandwidth demand
from the end users is
∑Ni
j=1 w
i
j. It will try to satisfy these
demands. However, Wi may not obtain exactly the same
bandwidth as the total demands from the auction. Follow the
same notations used above, we can define the utility for Wi
as:
Ui = pi ·min

Ni∑
j=1
wij,KiB
 −
Ki∑
j=1
cij. (4)
We can see that if Wi obtains more bandwidth from the
auction, it can only charge the end users according to their
total demands.
3) End Users: Considering the service price and evaluation
of unit data rate, we define the utility of Uij as the difference
between its evaluation of the unit data rate and the total
payment of the obtained bandwidth from Wi. Note that αi
is the evaluation of the unit data rate from Wi.
U ij = αiR
i
j − piwij = αiwij ln
1 + gijwij
 − piwij. (5)
D. Definition of Concepts
In this part, we clarify some concepts we will use in this
paper and the economic properties we would like to achieve.
Definition 1. Dominant Strategy: a dominant strategy of a
player is the one that maximize its utility regardless of what
other players’ strategies are. Mathematically, if xi is player
i’s strategy, for any x′i , xi, and any strategy profile of others
x−i, we have Ui(xi, x−i) ≥ Ui(x′i , x−i). If the inequality always
holds, xi is a strongly dominant one. Otherwise, xi is a weakly
dominant one.
Definition 2. Truthfulness: an auction is truthful if any
player’s true evaluation is its dominant strategy.
It means that given other players’ strategy profile and the
auction rules fixed, a player cannot improve its utility by
submitting any bid that is different from its true bid (a vector
of its true evaluation).
When designing auction mechanisms, it is crucial to make
them truthful. It is the most critical property and has been well
accepted in the research literature [2].
Definition 3. Individual Rationality: an auction is individual
rational if no buyer is charged more than its bid and no seller
is paid less than its ask. It guarantees the validness of the
auction result.
4TABLE I: Key notations in this paper.
S The spectrum holder in our scenario
US The utility of S
N The number of WSPs in our scenario
B0 The total bandwidth for sale from the SH
C The number of channels for sale
B The bandwidth of each channel
b0 The bandwidth of guard band between channels
W The set of all WSPs
Wi The WSP with index i
pi The price for unit bandwidth provided by Wi
p∗i The optimal price for Wi
αi The evaluation for unit data rate provided by Wi
Ni The number of end users subscripted with Wi
Bi The bidding vector of Wi in the auction
bij The bid for the j-th winning channel of Wi
bsk The k-th highest bids in the auction submitted by the WSPs
b˜ij The true valuation for the j-th winning channel by Wi
cij The price for the j-th winning channel of Wi in the auction
Ki The number of channels won by Wi in the auction
Ui The utility of Wi
Uij The j-th end user of Wi
wij The bandwidth demand of Uij
w∗ij The optimal bandwidth demand of Uij
gij A factor related to the signal-to-noise ratio of Uij
Gi The sum of gij of all end users of Wi
U ij The utility of Uij
Definition 4. Social Efficiency: an auction is social efficient
if the aggregate of all players’ utilities is optimized. It shares
a common meaning with Social Welfare. Here we consider the
aggregate utility of the SH and the WSPs, denoted by S =∑N
i=1 Ui + US . The users’ utilities are not considered in Social
Welfare because there is no direct relationship between the
users and the auction.
IV. Spectrum Trading Framework Design
Based on the system model and spectrum trading and pric-
ing procedure, in this section, we leverage backward induction
to analyze the strategies of the SH, the WSPs and the end
users. In this paper, we assume all of them are rational and
trying to maximize their own utility.
We first analyze the pricing decision of the WSPs in stage
IV based on the possible reactions from the end users in
stage V. The optimal bidding strategies in terms of number of
channels to purchase and individual evaluations is determined
in stage III based on possible revenue from the pricing. The
auction scheme in stage II will be decide by the SH consider-
ing only the economic properties to achieve. We observe that
the WSPs can have flexible demands and evaluation. To enable
such flexibilities and extract higher revenue, we will present
the design of the FlexAuc (Flexible Auction) mechanism for
the SH. Based on the auction scheme and possible outcomes,
in Stage I, the SH determines optimal channelization schemes
on the spectrum.
A. Users’ Demand Strategies
Given the price pi announced by Wi, in Stage V, end
users optimize their utility by selecting the optimal demand
strategies. For the ease of analysis, we make an approximation:
U ij ≈ αiwij ln
gij
wij
− piwij. (6)
Its first and second order derivatives are
∂U ij
∂wij
= αi
ln gijwij − 1
 − pi.
and
∂2U ij
∂wij
2 = −
αi
wij
< 0.
So the optimal demand strategy is
w∗ij = g
i
je
−1− piαi . (7)
The error introduced by approximation in (6) decreases with
pi. Generally, the error is very small in our simulation with
the ITU and COST models [14].
B. WSPs’ Pricing Strategies
In stage IV, Wi decides the optimal price pi based on the
auction result and evaluation of users’ demands.
To find the optimal price p∗i that maximizes Eq. (4), given
the number of winning channel Ki, we need to discuss two
cases.
Case (1): if KiB >
∑Ni
j=1 w
∗i
j , Eq. (4) can be simplified as
pi ·
Ni∑
j=1
w∗ij −
Ki∑
j=1
cij, (8)
which has the only variable pi. The unique solution p∗i = αi
can be obtained. Physically, it means that ifWi has purchased
abundant bandwidth, the optimal price that brings highest
revenue is p∗i = αi. Though part of its spectrum is unused,
it is nonprofitable to offer a reduced price to stimulate more
spectrum demand.
Case (2): if KiB ≤ ∑Nij=1 w∗ij , the optimal p∗i ≥ αi because
pi
∑Ni
j=1 w
∗i
j −
∑Ki
j=1 c
i
j is monotonously decreasing in the re-
gion pi ∈ [1,∞). Therefore, the highest utility is achieved
when
∑Ni
j=1 w
∗i
j = KiB. Let Gi =
∑Ni
j=1 g
i
j. We can obtain
p∗i = αi
(
ln GiKiB − 1
)
, where Gie
−1− piαi =
∑Ni
j=1 w
∗i
j which is
the aggregated demand of Wi’s users. In this case, if Wi
purchases more bandwidth, it can lower the price and increase
the utility.
To make a summary, the optimal price for Ki channel is
p∗i (Ki) =

αi if KiB > Gie−2,
αi
(
ln
Gi
KiB
− 1
)
Otherwise.
(9)
5C. WSPs’ Bidding Strategies
For Stage III, we analyze WSPs’ bidding strategies in the
auction. Since we take truthfulness and efficiency as the most
desirable properties of an auction design, the WSPs are aware
that the auction design by the SH is truthful and efficient.
Therefore, the WSPs bid with their truthful evaluations of the
channels.
In our problem, both the quantity and evaluation of channels
are dynamic and flexible. In such case, the challenge is how
to determine the best bidding strategies in terms of quantity
and evaluation. We propose to decide the best strategies by
the pricing scheme and users’ demand responses.
Let us start with a simple case. Suppose Wi gets only one
channel in the auction. Its utility can be calculated by Eq. (5) as
Ui(Ki = 1). WhenWi considers the bidding strategy, it cannot
predict the number of winning channels Ki and the payments
{cij}. A well-designed auction mechanism guarantees that the
true value is the best strategy, which simplifies the strategy
making process.
First, we need to elaborate the true value in this problem.
In previous auction works, the true values exist in the mind of
buyers and sellers in advance. If a buyer is asked to pay the
true value to win the object, the utility is zero. In this paper,
we propose that the true value should be decided according to
particular scenarios. We also define the true value as the one
that makes a buyer’s utility zero given that it selects the best
strategies in the later stages. We use b˜ij to denote WSP’s true
value for its j-th won channel. So we get Wi’s true value for
its first channel as:
b˜i1 = p
∗
i (1) ·min

Ni∑
j=1
w∗ij (1), B
 . (10)
p∗i (k) and w
∗i
j (k) stand for the optimal pricing strategy and
demand strategy given Wi has k channels. Eq. (10) is also
the marginal benefit that the first channel can bring to Wi. If
Wi pays more than this amount to get it,Wi definitely makes
a loss.
Similarly, considering the marginal benefit of each addi-
tional channel for Wi, the true value for Wi’s k-th channel
(2 ≤ k ≤ C) will be
b˜ik =p
∗
i (k) ·min

Ni∑
j=1
w∗ij (k), kB

− p∗i (k − 1) ·min

Ni∑
j=1
w∗ij (k − 1), (k − 1)B
 .
(11)
By intuition, the optimal bids for any Wi are decreasing
as the marginal benefit of the first several channels is higher
than the latter ones. We can derive this relationship from Eq.
(7)(9)(10)(11) to verify its correctness. We have the theorem:
Theorem 1. Any Wi’s bidding structure presents marginal
decreasing property. Mathematically, b˜i1 ≥ b˜i2 ≥ · · · ≥ b˜iC .
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
In fact this property facilitates the algorithm design for
FlexAuc, such that we can obtain linear-time algorithms.
Algorithm 1 Flexible Auction: winner determination
1: Find the C largest bids from {bij}, (i = 1, · · · ,N, j =
1, · · · ,C), with a max heap.
2: Let {bsk}, k = 1, · · · ,C be the sorted array of the C largest
bids in descending order.
3: Ki = 0, for all i = 1, · · · ,N.
4: for k = 1 to C do
5: if bsk is a bid submitted by Wi then
6: Ki = Ki + 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: return (Wi wins Ki channels, i = 1, · · · ,N).
D. Auction Design
Now we analyze the auction design in stage II. The goal
in auction design is two-fold. First, the auction mechanism
should be truthful. Therefore, Wi bidding with its true values
is the dominant strategy. Second, the auction should provide
efficiency, which means the channels should be allocated
to those bidders who evaluate them most. Therefore, SH’s
revenue can be increased.
The auction is a sealed-bid auction with one seller (SH)
and multiple buyers (WSPs). The auction procedure consists
of two parts: the winner determination (channel allocation)
and payment mechanism. As the channels are identical, the
channel allocation result is presented in the form of the number
of winning channels {Ki}. The payment mechanism can be
flexible. In this paper, we consider three different payment
mechanisms. The first one is the well-known VCG mechanism
[15], [16], [17]. The second one is a modified version of the
uniform pricing mechanism which preserves truthfulness for
multi-unit demands. Besides, we also design a partial uniform
pricing mechanism which achieves higher revenue than the
other two schemes.
1) Winner determination: The auction is a standard auction
such that the C bids with highest values are selected as winning
bids:
∑N
i=1 Ki = C. This can be easily achieved by selecting the
largest C bids from all NC bids submitted by the WSPs, which
is done by building a maximum heap (Algorithm 1). Note that
the SH does not need to sort all the bids. He needs to know
only the largest C bids to announce them as the winning bids.
2) Payment mechanism: The payment mechanism is rel-
atively independent of the previous winner determination
part. Here we introduce three possible payment mechanisms,
namely: (i) the VCG mechanism, (ii) the modified uniform
pricing mechanism, and (iii) the partial uniform pricing mech-
anism. The algorithms for payment mechanisms are following
the notations in Algorithm 1.
The VCG Mechanism: The idea of VCG mechanism
is highly abstract and can be applied to universal cases,
independent of the form of bidding structure, items to be
sold, and so on. With VCG mechanism, Wi’s payment is
determined by the externality he exerts on other competing
WSPs. In this auction, the externality is the sum of Ki highest
losing bids submitted by other WSPs’. The VCG mechanism
is designed as Algorithm 2. Still the same, the SH needs to
6Algorithm 2 Flexible Auction: payment mechanism (VCG)
1: Double the size of {bsk} to 2C.
2: Find the 2C largest bids from {bij}, (i = 1, · · · ,N, j =
1, · · · ,C), with a max heap.
3: Store the sorted array of the 2C largest bids in descending
order in {bsk}, k = 1, · · · , 2C.
4: for i = 1 to N do
5: if Ki > 0 then
6: losingBid = 0
7: j = C + 1
8: totalPayment(i) = 0
9: while losingBid < Ki do
10: if bsj is not submitted by Wi then
11: totalPayment(i) = totalPayment(i) + bsj
12: losingBid = losingBid + 1
13: end if
14: j = j + 1
15: end while
16: end if
17: end for
18: return (Wi pays totalPayment(i), i = 1, · · · ,N).
know the highest 2C bids only. Lines 1 to 3 do this job.
Because even in the extreme case where one WSP wins all C
channels, its externality is the following C largest bids. That
means knowledge of the largest 2C bids is sufficient.
The Uniform Pricing Mechanism: The general idea of the
uniform pricing is to charge each channel the same price as the
channels are identical. It increases the buyers’ acceptance since
there is no price discrimination. The uniform price charged is
also called the market clearing price. However, in general,
uniform pricing is not truthful for multi-unit demand [18].
To guarantee the truthfulness, the clearing price should be
selected independent of the winners’ bids. Here we introduce a
modification of the traditional uniform pricing scheme. Instead
of choosing the highest losing bids or the lowest winning bids
as the clearing price, we use the highest bids from the bidder
who loses all its bids. This modified version of uniform pricing
only works under the condition that C < N. That is because
only when C < N, we are guaranteed to be able to find a
WSP who does not win a channel at all. In the rest of this
paper, we mean “uniform pricing” by this modified version.
The modified uniform pricing algorithm is given by Algorithm
3. In Algorithm 3, we find a WSP who has not won any
channel in the auction via line 4. Then its highest bids would
be charged for the winners as the unit price for any single
channel (line 5, 8).
The Partial Uniform Pricing Mechanism: Motivated by
the previous two mechanisms, we design the partial uniform
pricing, which preserves both their advantages. By partial uni-
form pricing, a winning WSP pays for each of its channels the
same amount of money. Its unit price is determined by others’
highest losing bid. But different WSPs can have different unit
prices. There are two advantages of partial uniform pricing
compared with uniform pricing. On one hand, this mechanism
will generate revenue for the SH no less than that of VCG
Algorithm 3 Flexible Auction: payment mechanism (Uniform
Pricing)
1: (Assert C < N)
2: maxLoserBid = 0 // Store the highest bid from a bidder
who does not win any channel
3: for i = 1 to N do
4: if bi1 < b
s
C and b
i
1 > maxLoserBid then
5: maxLosrBid = bi1
6: end if
7: end for
8: return (Wi pays totalPayment(i) = maxLosrBid × Ki, i =
1, · · · ,N).
Algorithm 4 Flexible Auction: payment mechanism (Partial
Uniform Pricing)
1: // Find the largest losing bids of each bidder and stores in
an array maxLoserBid
2: for i = 1 to N do
3: if Ki < C then
4: maxLoserBid(i) = biKi+1
5: else
6: maxLoserBid(i) = 0
7: end if
8: end for
9: Find the two largest one from maxLoserBid, denoted as
m1 and m2, (m1 > m2).
10: for i = 1 to N do
11: if maxLoserBid(i) == m1 then
12: totalPayment(i) = m2 × Ki
13: else
14: totalPayment(i) = m1 × Ki
15: end if
16: end for
17: return (Wi pays totalPayment(i), i = 1, · · · ,N).
mechanism as stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. In any case, the revenue generated by the Partial
Uniform Pricing Mechanism is larger or equal than that
generated by the VCG Pricing Mechanism or the Uniform
Pricing Mechanism.
We omit the formal proof here because of its simplicity. An
intuitive explanation is as follows. By partial uniform pricing
mechanism, Wi pays the amount of Ki multiples others’
highest losing bid. By VCG mechanism, Wi pays the amount
of the sum of others’ highest Ki bids. Also, these payment
should be no lower than the highest bid submitted by a WSP
who wins no channels (the unit price in the uniform pricing
mechanism).
On the other hand, this mechanism does not require the
condition C < N since we always have a losing bid as
Wi’s clearing price. The partial uniform pricing mechanism
is shown in Algorithm 4. In Algorithm 4, maxLoserBid(i) is
the highest bid from Wi that does not win in the auction.
For any WSP, either m1 or m2 must be the highest losing bid
submitted from another WSP. In line 11, we are avoiding the
7case that the highest losing bid is the one submitted by Wi,
which may result in untruthful bidding.
As a summary, we can actually combine any of the three
payment mechanisms with the standard winner determination
part to get a complete auction rule. The auction is truthful
with any of the three mechanisms. The auction also maximizes
social welfare. These two properties will be proved later.
E. Spectrum Partition
In stage I, the SH decides the channelization scheme to
determine the number of channels for sale in the auction. On
one hand, from Eq. (1), we can see that with smaller C, the
overhead of guard band would be smaller. On the other hand,
A small C means that the SH sells bigger piece of channels to
fewer WSPs. Considering that the WSPs’ marginal evaluations
on spectrum bandwidth are decreasing, it is better for the SH
to further divide the big spectrum piece to smaller ones and
sell them to more WSPs. Therefore, the SH needs to find the
optimal channel partitioning scheme to maximize its revenue.
To choose optimal channelization scheme, there are two
challenges. First, how can the SH estimates the bids in the
auction? The flexibility of channel demands and valuations
from the WSPs make this task complicated. Second, there are
three different payment choices in the auction, how can the SH
determine the optimal channelization despite the difference in
the payment mechanisms? We solve these challenges via the
following steps.
1) Bid Estimation: We can derive the relationship between
the revenue of the SH and the number of channels. From
Eq. (9) and Eq. (11), we can see that b˜ik (the bids from
Wi) is a piece-wise function. However, when k > Gie−2B ,
p∗i = αi, therefore, b˜
i
k = 0. A bid of zero is meaningless in the
auction, therefore, we can only consider the bids when they
are positive. Suppose k < Gie
−2
B , substitute Eq. (9) into Eq.
(11), we have:
b˜ik = αiB
(
ln
Gih(k)
B
− 1
)
, (12)
where h(k) = (k−1)
k−1
kk .
Here Gi and αi are parameters relates to individual WSPs.
The SH normally has no ways to obtain their exact values.
However, in practice, based on the public information of the
WSPs such as their annual report or market surveys, the SH
can have an estimation of these values. For example, if the
distribution of Gi and αi are known, the SH can leverage
statistic method to estimate the bids [19]. For simplicity, in
this paper, we assume that the SHs has the estimations of
GEi and α
E
i for Gi and αi respectively. With these assumption,
substitute Eq. (1) into Eq. (12), we have:
b˜ik = α
E
i
(
B0 + b0
C
− b0
) (
ln
GEi h(k)C
B0 − (c − 1)b0 − 1
)
. (13)
2) A Uniform Indicator: Despite the difference of the three
payment mechanisms, we can use a uniform indicator to guide
the channelization decision to maximize US . We denote the
k-th highest bid submitted by the WSPs in the auction as bsk.
The following relationship holds:
Lemma 2. If there are C channels and more than one WSPs
in the auction, C×bsC+1 is a tight upper bound for the revenue
of the SH in all the three payment mechanisms.
We prove the Lemma in the Appendix. Since C × bsC+1 is a
tight upper bound for all the three payment mechanisms, we
define U IS as the indicator for US :
U IS = C × bsC+1. (14)
3) Optimal Channel Partitioning: The optimization prob-
lem for the SH can be expresses as:
maximize U IS = C × bsC+1
subject to bsC+1 is the C + 1-th highest among b˜
i
k,
(13)
variables {C}. (15)
However, there is no close-form solution for the problem
(15) since there is no close-form expression for (13) in the
general case. The SH can leverage numerical method to obtain
the optimal value of C. From (1), we have:
C ≤ CMAX =
⌊
B0 − b0
b0
⌋
. (16)
Therefore, an binary search can be perform within the range
of [0,CMAX] for an optimal C.
V. Economic Properties and Time Complexity
In this section, we prove the properties of FlexAuc: truth-
fulness, individual rationality, and efficiency. We also analyze
its time complexity. The proofs of the following theorems are
provided in the Appendix.
A. Truthfulness
Theorem 2. FlexAuc is truthful with any of the three pay-
ment mechanisms such that Wi’s best bidding strategy is
{˜bi1, · · · , b˜ik, · · · , b˜iC}.
B. Individual rationality
Theorem 3. FlexAuc is individual rational. In another word,
any Wi will not pay more than its true valuation. Mathemat-
ically, for any Wi, cij ≤ b˜ij,∀1 ≤ j ≤ Ki.
Individual rationality is a necessary property to motivate
participants in the auction.
C. Efficiency
Theorem 4. FlexAuc maximizes social welfare.
8D. Time Complexity
We now analyze the running time of the algorithms of
FlexAuc.
For Algorithm 1, building heap takes O(N). Heap ad-
justment takes O(log N). The complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(C log N). For Algorithm 2, lines 1 to 3 take O(C log N).
Lines 4 to 17 take O(NC). So the complexity of Algorithm 2
is O(CN). Both Algorithms 3 and 4 take O(N) time.
It means that FlexAuc with three payment mechanisms
induces the computational overhead O(NC), O(N + C log N)
and O(N + C log N) respectively. Since SH receives in total
NC bids from WSPs, the overhead is definitely acceptable.
VI. Numerical Results
Here we present simulation results to verify our theoretical
analysis, evaluate the performance and compare it with exist-
ing mechanisms. The experiment environment is MATLAB.
We first present the WSPs’ strategies in terms of bidding
and service pricing. Then we show properties of FlexAuc,
including: i) the truthfulness of FlexAuc, which is our key
design target; ii) the impact of payment mechanisms on the
SH’s revenue; and iii) comparison between FlexAuc and a
scheme from existing works. Finally, we show the SH’s
strategies on spectrum partitioning and the impact of the size
of the guard band.
A. Settings
The default settings of parameters are as follows. B0 = 50
(MHz). b0 = 0 (MHz). N = 10. Ni is randomly distributed
within [500, 1000] for i = 1, · · · ,N. {αi}s are equally dis-
tributed in [0.2, 0.4]. The transmission range to the base
station is randomly chosen in [500, 1000] (meter) for any user
with a uniform distribution. Assume that 75% of users are
indoor and their service requirement is originated from indoor
environment, and 25% from outdoor environment.
We define the attenuation factors as the multiplicative in-
verses of the path-losses based on the ITU and COST models
[14].
1) From base station to outdoor user U ij:
H j = 10−4.9(
r
1000
)−4 f −310−µ0/10;
2) From base station to indoor user U ij:
H j = 10−3.7(
r
1000
)−310−µ0/1010−
18.3n( n+2n+1 −0.46)
10 ;
The other default values of parameters are as follows: Pi = 1
(watt), n0 = −204 (dB/Hz), r (in meters) is the transmission
range, f = 2000 (MHz) is the carrier frequency, n = 20 is the
number of floors in the path, µ0 is the log-normal shadowing
factor with the standard deviation of 8 (dB).
In order to compare our mechanism with previous auction
mechanism, a frequently used scheme that restricts each WSP
to submit only one bid and the SH to make a 0/1 allocation
[4][10] is introduced as a baseline scheme. We call it the
OneBid auction. In the OneBid, eachWi instead of submitting
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follows the marginal effect.
TABLE II: Truthfulness of WSPs’ bids.
N, C U ji (u) < U
j
i (t) U
j
i (u) = U
j
i (t) U
j
i (u) > U
j
i (t)
10, 5 0.1012 0.8988 0
10, 10 0.1331 0.8669 0
10, 20 0.1721 0.8279 0
bids with flexible demands and valuations, the bid vector looks
like {bi1 > 0, 0, · · · , 0}.
All results in the following sections have been averaged over
100 cases with randomly generated parameters.
B. Results
1) Strategies of the WSPs: To observe the auction results
and WSP’s strategies, we assume the size of guard band is 0
and fix the number of channels for sale as C = 5. Then there
will be at most winners in the auction.
Fig. 3 shows the WSPs’ utilities under different pricing
strategies. We select the three winning WSPs after the auction
and calculated their utilities under prices of different ratio
of the optimal one: [0.1p∗i , 0.2p
∗
i , . . . , 2p
∗
i ]. We can see that
setting higher or lower prices (other than the ratio of 1) may
lead to their overall losses. It verifies the correctness of WSPs’
optimal pricing strategies.
Fig. 4 presents two WSPs’ bids structure. The results verify
our theoretical analysis of the diminishing marginal value of
obtained channels (Theorem 1). In this figure, W2’s first bid
value is small than W1’s fourth bid. If W2 wins one channel,
then W1 must win at least four channels.
2) Truthfulness of FlexAuc: In order to show the truthful-
ness of FlexAuc, we show the utility cannot be enhanced if
the WSPs are not bidding truthfully. We generate 100 cases
with random radio parameters and randomly selected payment
mechanism. In each case, we do 100 times of random selection
of one WSP (either winner or loser) and make a random
adjustment from its true bidding values (while still keeping
the marginal effect of bids). Table II shows the truthfulness
of the bids. Ui(u) and Ui(t) are WSP i’s utilities when he
bids untruthfully and truthfully respectively. The values are
the probabilities of the three cases with different N and C
values. We see that in any case, U ji (u) > U
j
i (t) never happens,
which supports the truthfulness of our auction (Theorem 2).
3) Impact of FlexAuc’s Payment Mechanisms: To observe
the impact of the payment mechanisms. We assume the size
of guard band is 0 and varies C in the range of [3, 5, 7, 20, 30].
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Fig. 5: Comparison of three payment mechanisms.
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In the first three cases, C < N, while C > N in the last two
cases. We calculate the revenue generated by the three payment
mechanisms. We treat the VCG scheme as a benchmark and
calculate the ratio of the revenues generated by the other two
schemes and to those from the VCG scheme.
When C < N, Fig. 5a, 5b and 5c compare the revenue
from the three pricing mechanisms in the auction. We observe
that the partial uniform pricing always generate revenue for
SH no worse than VCG (ratio ≥ 1) and uniform pricing,
which verifies Lemma 1. However, the uniform pricing does
not outperform VCG all the time and vice versa. Also, the
performance gaps of the three mechanisms increase with C.
When the 10 WSPs bid for 7 channels, uniform pricing
generates sub-optimal results for the SH in most cases.
When C > N, uniform pricing does not work any more.
We compare the revenue from the remaining two policies. In
Fig. 5d, all the data points are with value larger than 1, which
verifies the advantages of partial uniform pricing under the
two cases of C = 20 and C = 30.
4) Comparison of FlexAuc and OneBid: To show the
advantage of FlexAuc in the aspect that it enables flexible
demands and valuations, we present the comparison between
FlexAuc and the OneBid auction in Fig. 6. We set C in the
range of [1, 2, · · · , 9] and plot both the SH’s revenue and the
social welfare from the auction result.
We observe that when C is small enough (C ≤ 3), the
two auction almost perform the same in both SH’s revenue
and social welfare. When C is larger, FlexAuc outperforms
the OneBid and the gaps keep increasing in both revenue
and social welfare. By enabling the flexible auction, both
the revenue of the SH and the social welfare can be greatly
increased.
5) Strategy of the SH: We show in this part how the SH
determine the optimal channelization scheme. We vary the size
of the guard band in the range [0, 0.1, 0.5, 1] and plot the
average revenue from the VCG and partial uniform pricing
schemes under different C in Fig. 7. Since optimal C may be
larger than N, we omit the case of uniform pricing here. We
plot the social welfare for b0 = 0 and the corresponding U IS s
under other b0s.
Fig. 7a gives numerical results for optimal C when b0 = 0.
We see that the larger C is, the higher social welfare it
achieves. When C is large enough, the increment of social
welfare gets smaller. Strictly, we have the property that
S (kC) ≥ S (C) under the same auction rule, where k is any
positive integer. An intuition here is that after the further
partition of current channels, the SH can allocate k times of
number of channels to current winning WSPs, which leads to
the same social welfare. So the further partition of channels
does not decrease social welfare.
From Fig. 7b,7c,7d, we can see that when b0 , 0. There
exist a C that maximize the SH’s revenue in either payments
schemes. In all the three cases, U IS is no less than the revenue
provide by either payment schemes, which verifies that it is
their upper bound (Lemma 2).
6) Impact of the Guard Band: From Fig. 7, we can also
observe the impact of the guard band on the SH’s revenue and
strategies. The results in the four sub-figures are based on the
same random settings of Gi and αi. First, we observe that the
wider the guard band is, the C resulting in the highest revenue
will also be larger. When b0 = 0, the highest revenue will be
achieved with an infinite C. Second, we also see that when
b0 is wider, the achieved revenue under the same C would be
smaller. That is due to the less available total bandwidth to
sale in the auction with wider guard band.
VII. Conclusion
The WSPs face dynamic and diversed users’ demands which
impact their decisions on how much bandwidth to purchase
and how much money to pay for the SH. Previous spectrum
auction studies do not pay attention to the tight relationship
between bidding strategies and service provisions. Existing
auction mechanism cannot be directly applied in this scenario
or with efficient computational performance. In this paper,
we analyze the end users’ demands response, WSPs’ optimal
pricing and bidding strategies, SH’s auction design and discuss
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Fig. 7: Influences of C on the SH’s revenue.
the spectrum partition. We propose FlexAuc as the solution
framework. FlexAuc consists of a standard winner determi-
nation part and a flexible payment mechanism. There are
three payment mechanisms studied and compared. All of them
are truthful and maximize social welfare. The computational
overhead of FlexAuc is linear to the input size of the bids.
We conduct comprehensive numerical simulation to verify our
conclusions.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: For all the three payment mechanisms, unit pay-
ment of one channel related to one or more losing bids in the
auction, for any W˜i and 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki, cij ≤ bsC+1. Moreover,∑N
i=1 Ki = C. Therefore,
N∑
i=1
Ki∑
j=1
b˜ij ≤ CbsC+1, (17)
The left of which equals to US .
The above bound is also tight. We can construct a case
in which bsC+1 equals to b˜
z
1. Therefore, the highest bid of the
losing buyer W˜z will be the unit price for all the three payment
mechanisms.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: By Eq. (10)(11), we have
Ki∑
k=1
b˜ik = p
∗
i (Ki) ·min

Ni∑
j=1
w∗ij (Ki),KiB
 . (18)
Substitute Eq. (9) into it, then we get
Ki∑
k=1
b˜ik = min
{(
ln
Gi
KiB
− 1
)
KiB,Gie−2
}
. (19)
Define function
f (Ki) =
(
ln
Gi
KiB
− 1
)
KiB (20)
Because
∂ f (Ki)
∂Ki
= B
(
ln
Gi
KiB
− 2
)
≥ 0 (21)
and
∂2 f (Ki)
∂K2i
= − B
Ki
< 0. (22)
Gie−2 is a constant and the operator min keeps the convexity.
So Eq. (18) is a convex function.
Note that f (Ki) is positive for all Ki = 1, 2, · · · . By f (Ki)’s
continuity, we have
f (0) = lim
Ki→0+
f (Ki) = lim
x= 1Ki→+∞
B
(
ln GXB − 1
)
x
= lim
x→+∞
B
x
= 0.
(23)
By Eq. (18)’s convexity, we have
2
Ki+1∑
k=1
b˜ik ≥
Ki∑
k=1
b˜ik +
Ki+2∑
k=1
b˜ik (24)
for all Ki = 0, 1, 2, · · · . After simplification, we obtain b˜i1 ≥
b˜i2 ≥ · · · ≥ b˜iC .
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: To prove the truthfulness, we need to show that
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ C, {˜bi1, · · · , b˜ik, · · · , b˜iC} weakly
dominates any other {bi1, · · · , bik, · · · , biC}.
First we show that by replacing only bik with b˜
i
k (if
bik−1 ≤ b˜ik ≤ bik+1), the new strategy bi1, · · · , b˜ik, · · · , biC weakly
dominates the original strategy bi1, · · · , bik, · · · , biC . By original
strategy Wi wins Ki channels and by new one he wins K∗i
channels. We discuss the three possible cases:
1) Case 1: Ki = K∗i .Wi wins the same number of channels
by both strategies. By any of the three mechanisms, its
payment is determined by other WSPs’ bids. So Wi
utilities are the same by both strategies.
2) Case 2: Ki < K∗i . It means Wi wins more channel
by new strategy. Its payment will be no more than
the marginal benefit of the additional channel(s). So its
utility is improved or keep the same by the new strategy.
New strategy dominates original one.
3) Case 3: Ki > K∗i . By new strategies, Wi wins less
channels. Wi’s bid on k-th channel does matter. bik is
one of the highest C biddings but b˜ik is not. As both b
i
k
and b˜ik are larger than b
i
j ( j = k + 1, k + 2, · · · ,C), so bij
is not one of the highest C biddings. So Ki = K∗i + 1.
That means the only difference is that original strategy
gets k-th channel and new strategy does not. According
11
to the payment mechanisms, by original strategy, Wi
pays more than the marginal benefit b˜ik to get the k-th
channel. So New strategy dominates original one.
Then for any strategy {bi1, · · · , biC}, we can adjust
it in reverse order repeatedly like bubble sort
algorithm: {bi1, · · · , biC} → {bi1, · · · ,min{˜biC , biC−1}} →
{bi1, · · · ,min{˜bik, bik−1}, · · · } → · · · → {˜bi1,···} → · · · →
{˜bi1, b˜i2 · · · } → · · · until it becomes {˜bi1, · · · , b˜iC}. It can be
achieved by no more than C(C+1)2 adjustments. During the
adjustments, the new strategies dominant the old ones. So
{˜bi1, · · · , b˜iC} dominates any {bi1, · · · , biC}.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Suppose b˜ij is a winning bid from W˜i and c
i
j is
the corresponding price. According to the winner selection
procedure and the payment mechanisms, we have b˜ij ≥ bsC and
cij ≤ bsC+1. Furthermore, {bsk} are sorted in descending order in
the auction, we have bsC ≥ bsC+1. Therefore, b˜ij ≥ cij holds.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
It is well-known that VCG mechanism maximizes social
welfare. We provide a simple proof here.
Proof: An auction rule R∗ is efficient if it maximizes
social welfare,
R∗(x) ∈ arg max
∀R
∑
E jx j, (25)
where x j = 0, 1. By VCG mechanism, the payment of bidder
i is
ci = W(0, x−i) −W−i(x). (26)
Bidder i’s utility is
Ei − ci = Ei + W−i(x) −W(0, x−i)
= W(x) −W(0, x−i). (27)
So maximization of its own utility is equivalent to maximiza-
tion of social welfare.
We know that the uniform pricing auction and partial
uniform pricing auction distinguish from VCG auction only
in the payment part. The payment effect can be canceled out
by the summation of WSPs’ and SH’s utilities. So auctions
with the two payment mechanism also maximize social wel-
fare. It means an auction maximizes social welfare as long
as it allocates items to those who evaluate them most. By
motivating WSPs to bid truthfully and selecting the highest C
bids, FlexAuc indeed maximizes social welfare.
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